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The Crisis in the Steel Industry 
Mike Donaldson and Trish Donaldson 
 
Introduction 
On May 7, 1982 BHP's wholly-owned subsidiary, Australian Iron and Steel 
announced that 2500 jobs would be lost at the Port Kembla steelworks. BHP hoped 
by this workforce reduction "to push down production costs and to make Australian 
steel competitive again on its own home market". The reason for this drastic step, 
according to the company, was that it had virtually lost its export markets because of 
the international glut, and that it faced severe competition on the domestic market 
from imported steel. This article evaluates this analysis and argues that it conceals 
as much as it reveals. 
 
BHP is the steel industry in Australia; in 1979 it supplied between 85 and 95 percent 
of the market. It controls large reserves of its main raw materials, iron ore and coal 
and owns or has an interest in the companies which supply the other raw materials 
connected with steel making, including ferro alloys, limestone, dolomite, manganese, 
refractories, tin, zinc and cement. 
 
The company also sells about 60 percent of its domestic product to companies  
which it owns or has a major interest in. BHP wholly owns John Lysaghts (JLA) and 
Australian Wire Industries (AWI) and Titan Manufacturing. It owns 85.6 percent of 
Commonwealth Steel (Comsteel), 49.75 percent of Tubemakers and 67 percent of 
Rheem Australia. 
 
At the end of May 1979, BHP employed 36,300 workers at its four main plants, Port 
Kembla accounting for 54 percent, Newcastle 28 percent, Whyalla 15 percent and 
Kwinana three percent. But even this evidence of BHP's significance as an employer 
underestimates its local significance. In Wollongong, BHP subsidiaries employ about 
one in four of all workers, and three quarters of the manufacturing workforce in 
Shellharbour and Wollongong local government areas. Even assuming a modest 
multiplier of 2, a reduction the steel workforce of 3,000 would push visible 
unemployment in the district up past 15 percent, more than double the national 
average. 
 
Federal Government's Position 
The Federal government's official policy on industrial development was expressed in 
the White Paper on Manufacturing in 1977. The government is concerned to develop 
a stronger and more specialised industrial base and to encourage investment that 
will be efficient, internationally competitive and  export oriented. 
[33] 
 
The Industries Assistance Commission (IAC) was directed by the Whitlam 
government in 1973 to review the steel industry. The Commission published its draft 
report in March 1979 and in line with the Fraser government's attempts to restructure 
the manufacturing sector, argued that tariffs should be replaced by a subsidy geared 
to the expansion of exports. To  become more competitive internationally, BHP, 
argued the Commission, would have to undertake major technological change. 
At a public hearing on the draft report, BHP repeated the call made in its initial 
submission for improved depreciation allowances, and informed the government and 
the IAC that a major expansion of the steel industry was unlikely without improved 
tax concessions. 
 
When the final IAC report was brought down BHP had succeeded in getting the 
recommendations in the draft reversed. Instead of recommending a drop 
in tariffs, the IAC finally suggested that steel tariffs be maintained at the average 
level then applicable. BHP remained worried, though, about another aspect of the 
IAC report, its opposition to any form of increased depreciation allowances. As 
stated in the final report: 
On the basis of BHP's evidence to this inquiry, accelerated depreciation 
provisions for iron and steel production would merely reinforce the company's 
stated intention of continuing to develop to essentially meet the anticipated 
needs of the domestic market ... The Commission could find no justification 
for making available accelerated depreciation concessions unless there was a 
clear and unequivocal commitment to export oriented development. 
 
Five months elapsed between the issuing of the final report on July 31, 1980 and its 
acceptance by the government in April 1981. It was during period that BHP's 
pronouncements on the 'crisis' in the steel industry became particularly loud. The 
government endorsed the IAC report, and promised further considerations in the 
budget in August. 
 
Between April and August the company's announcements of doom became 
increasingly strident. In June 1981, 2,000 steelworkers Kembla were affected by 
roster changes, a not unusual situation in the industry. The company claimed that 
these changes were necessitated because of rising steel imports, and that the only 
way the flood could be averted and jobs saved, was through the granting of 
massively increased allowances. These were duly handed out in the 1981 budget. 
 
The BHP had succeeded in making the Federal government back down on its central 
programme of industrial development. The Business Review Weekly (29.8.81 - 
4.9.81) commented that this reflected "the clout Sir James McNeill and the BHP 
hierarchy have with senior cabinet ministers". Specifically, the budget provisions 
enable capital expenditure on plant and equipment in the steel industry to be 
depreciated at 20 percent per annum where the current scheduled life is 5 years or 
more, and 33-1/3 percent where it is less than 5 years. No other company or industry 
had succeeded in winning such allowances. 
[34 ] 
 
Company Propaganda and Politics 
Between April and August 1981 media releases by BHP executives proclaimed the 
collapse of the steel industry brought on by a decline in the domestic market and a 
fall off in export sales. In fact, in 1980-81 the output of the Steel Division was up on 
the previous year and was the highest since the recession bit in 1974-75, and the 
division's profits rose, on a conventional accounting basis, from $96.6m in 1979-80 
to $105.5m in 1980-81. 
 
Export sales did decline from 1979 to 1981, but the reason for this drop was not 
made clear in the company's statements. The IAC suggested that a decline in steel 
exports is due to "capacity limitations and a strong upturn in domestic demand", that 
is, because the BHP has limited capacity it must choose between exporting and 
supplying the local market. It generally chooses the latter, and so declining exports 
can signal, not a crisis in the industry, but buoyant domestic demand. Indeed BHP 
told the IAC that it exported primarily to absorb new capacity installed ahead of local 
demand, or to offset faltering local demand, and there is evidence to suggest that 
BHP has in the past deliberately withdrawn from major export markets to meet local 
demand and preserve its monopoly position. 
 
Likewise claims by the BHP that large quantities of imported steel were damaging 
their position domestically, were untrue. Under the Illawarra Mercury headline, 
"Cheap Steel Forces Cuts" (7.4.81), the Steel Division's general manager Burgess 
spoke of 500,000 tonnes of ingot steel being imported per annum. In fact, this 
500,000 tonnes was the smallest amount of steel imported since 1969-70. 
[35] 
 
 
The Present Situation 
The current drop of employment in the steel industry can logically be explained in 
two ways. Either fewer workers are needed because fewer goods are being 
produced, i.e. workforce reductions are a product of a decline in the market; or work 
processes are being changed so that fewer workers are required to produce the 
same number of goods or more, i.e. job losses are a product of rationalisation and 
technological change. It is also possible (indeed likely) that both processes are 
occurring simultaneously. 
 
Steel Production 
Available figures for overall steel production for BHP, show a decline in production 
from 7.8m tonnes of raw steel produced in 1980-82, to 7.1m produced in 1981-82. 
Average monthly production for Port Kembla for raw steel has declined 16 percent 
on the previous year, Newcastle's has remained stable, and Whyalla's has increased 
20 percent. 
 
However, there is no marked downturn in tonnages of marketable steel produced. 
Marketable steel tonnages have remained markedly constant for the 11 years from 
1972 to 1982. Raw steel production figures measure the amount of liquid steel 
produced, and marketable steel is the finished product (rail, plate, sheet, etc.). The 
difference between the two is in the offcuts, trimming, etc. In terms of establishing 
the existence of a decline in the market, the pertinent figures are those relating to 
marketable steel product, not raw steel output. 
 
Table1: Production Figures ('000 tonnes of Steel) 1972-1982 (Year Ending May 
31) 
 
 
1972 
 
1973 
 
1974  
1975 
  
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
 
1982 
 
Raw Steel 
 
6,504 
 
6,144 
 
7,605 
 
7,938 
 
7,756 
 
7,438 
 
7,371 
 
7,510 
 
7,822 
 
7,830 
 
7,123 
 
Marketable 
steel  
 
5,904 
 
5,401 
 
5,772 
 
5,821 
 
5,864 
 
5,854 
 
5,793 
 
6,058 
 
6,153 
 
6,025 
 
5,831 
Export 478 1,015 991 1,823 2,029 2,111 1,980 1,664 1,051 641 1,062 
Domestic 4,247 4,298 4,798 4,495 3,970 3,676 3,699 4,461 5,087 5,188 4,897 
Source: BHP Pocket book, 1981:76 
* 1982 figures are projections based on figures released in BHP News Releases for 10 months up to 
March 1982. 
 
Raw steel production has declined in 1982 to reach its lowest since 1973, but 
marketable steel production has remained remarkably constant over the decade. 
The marketable steel produced between 1972 and 1982, ranged between 
5.4 million tonnes and 6.1 million, a variation of only 0.7 million tonnes. On average, 
the BHP has produced 5.9 million tonnes of marketable steel per year, and 1979, 
1980 and 1981 were all above average years. 
[36] 
 
Exports 
Export sales by BHP have declined since peaking in 1976-77, but the export figure 
for 1981-82 is up 40 percent on the figure for 1980-81, and it is also higher than the 
amount exported in 1979-80. The Financial Review (11.5.82) stated "In export 
markets BHP is holding its own despite the loss of major markets (namely China for 
pig iron) but ... exports could decline about mid-year because the company has 
decided to withdraw from loss-making sales on international markets". 
An internal BHP document of a confidential nature passed to the .Wollongong 
Workers' Research Centre states of March 1982, "we have been able to book 
substantial tonnages of material at returns which have been more acceptable than 
was the case during the second half of 1981 ... the situation is still extremely 
competitive". Export despatches were higher in mid-1982 than they were in 1979-80 
and 1980-81, but lower than in the peak in the mid-seventies. 
 
Domestic Market 
Although it is difficult to believe, given the massive volume of propaganda to the 
contrary, the domestic market was quite sound. Domestic despatches were lower in 
mid-1982 than in 1979-80 and in 1980-81 but higher than every other year in the last 
decade. Certainly other companies don't seem to share BHP's analysis of the 
collapse of the domestic steel market. Smorgon Consolidated Industries have 
opened a steel mill at Laverton North, Melbourne, to be equipped with an electric arc 
furnace, continuous casting plant and a rolling mill to output 200,000 tpa. In one day 
of trading alone, Humes Ltd splurged $16m in an attempt to take over BHP 
subsidiary ARC Industries, and finally paid $155m for less than 60 percent of it. 
Pioneer Sugar Mills bought 75 percent of Aquila Steel late last year, and BHP's 
most important steel subsidiary John Lysaght has been moving deeper into 
the steel industry. Early this year, Lysaght purchased Steelstocks' Padstow plant in 
Sydney and just recently it acquired the Independent Steel Company Ltd, the last 
remaining business in Victoria processing large quantities of imported steel. It has 
also expanded its Westernport operations. 
 
Imports 
Table 2 outlines the total production of BHP since 1971-72, and calculates the 
imports as percentage of domestic steel in addition to the more usual measure as 
percentage of domestic steel consumption. As mentioned previously the 500,000 
tonnes complained about by Burgess last year is the smallest amount imported for 
some time and the current figure of 700,000 tonnes is the third lowest since 1972. 
[37] 
 
 
Table 2: Australian Steel Production: Domestic Use of Steel and Steel Imports 
1972-821, ('000 tonnes) 
 
Australian 
Production 
BHP steel used 
domestically 
(1) 
Imports 
of steel 
(2) 
Imports as % of 
BHP steel used 
domestically 
(2 as % of 1) 
Imports as % of 
domestic steel 
consumption 
(2 as % of 1 & 2) 
1972 6,506 4,247 801 19 15 
1973 6,144 4,298 663 15 13 
1974 7,605 4,798 1,237 25 20 
1975 7,938 4,495 887 20 16 
1976 7,756 3,970 504 13 11 
1977 7,483 3,676 666 18 15 
1978 7,371 3,699 697 19 16 
1979 7,510 4,461 606 14 12 
1980 7,822 5,087 500 10 9 
1981
a 
7,830 5,188 760 15 12.7 
1982 7,123 4,897 700 14 12.5 
 
Source: BHP Pocketbook 1981: 76 
Australian Financial Review 11.5.82:1 
Hansard 21.4.82:1641 
Although the figures in this table are all derived from BHP sources, the BHP, in a comment on this 
paper, claimed that the "current" figures for imports from 1980 to 1982 are: 
582, 915 and 1069 (thousand tonnes). 
 
Furthermore, in May 1982, the Japan Iron and Steel Exporters Association called 
upon the Department of Industry and Commerce to examine "precisely what caused 
the increase in imports and how and to what extent did individual domestic mills or 
the Australian economy at large suffer any injury from the increased imports of 
foreign products". According to the Japanese exporters, their exports of hot rolled 
strip, sheet and plate steel had been on a stable and regular basis for many years, 
and the only variations were when Australian producers had requested large 
quantities for specific projects. 
[38] 
 
Figures from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry show that in 
1981 Japan exported 560,000 tonnes of steel to Australia. This was up from the 
350,000 tonnes which Japan exported in 1978, 1979 and 1980. Most of the increase 
was seamless pipe, demand for which was rising because of resources 
development. One of the major importers had been Steel Mains, a company in which 
Tubemakers has a substantial holding. Tubemakers itself had ceased making 
seamless pipe in 1978. Similarly with South Korean steel, BHP has conspicuously 
failed to make it clear that, while that country exported 88,000 tonnes of steel 
products to Australia last year, Australia exported 120,000 tonnes to Korea. 
 
Table 3: Raw Steel Production and Employment, AIS, Port Kembla, 1972-82. 
 
Year ended 
31 May 
 
Steel Ingots Production 
(`000 tonnes) 
Employment 
1972 3,659 19,956 
1973 4,044 20,119 
1974 4,342 20,127 
1975 4,644 20,823 
1976 4,756 20,478 
1977 4,426 19,747 
1978 4,405 19,178 
1979 4,214 19,808 
1980 4,512 20,266 
1981 4,839 20,549 
1982 4,028 19,500 
Source: 
BHP, Port Kembla; 1982 figures estimated from newspaper and company statements. 
 
AIS is currently arguing that because there has been a decline in raw steel 
production at its Port Kembla works, there needs to be job wastage or even 
retrenchments. The figures in Table 3 illustrate, however, that seldom before has 
there been the right relationship between employment and output that BHP suggests 
is now necessary. Between 1972 and 1976 there was a steady rise each year in raw 
steel production, but this was not accompanied by a uniform or regular rise in 
employment. Between 1975 and 1976 when AIS produced its till-then best ever 
tonnages, there was a loss of 345 jobs. Jobs and raw steel production declined over 
the next three years, except from 1978 to 1979, when employment jumped 630 jobs 
while output fell 191,000 tonnes. Output continued to rise, reaching its best ever in 
1981, and subsequently declined in 1982. As a result of this decline from record 
production, AIS commenced wasting jobs. 
[39] 
 
 
In the ten years from 1972 to 1981 AIS has produced an average of 4.38m tonnes 
each year. The 1982 production estimate of 4.02m tonnes was not substantially 
below average, and yet on this basis AIS has destroyed 3,877 jobs since September 
1981 through 'natural' wastage, firing, early retirements and voluntary resignations. 
In the past, the biggest ever drop in employment was the loss of 731 jobs between 
1976 and 1977. 
 
This reduction in employment has taken place despite a prediction in confidential 
sources noted above that in 1982 Australian steel requirements were expected to 
continue at the same overall volume as in 1981. At Whyalla, where production had 
been higher by 20 percent than in 1980-81, BHP planned to reduce the workforce by 
26 percent and trades personnel by 9 percent by 1985. 
 
There are clearly reasons other than the decline in raw steel production which are 
responsible for the loss of jobs in the steel industry. 
 
Job Loss and Technological Change 
In line with the IAC observations on modernisation, AIS is introducing, a third vessel 
in its Basic Oxygen Steel (BOS) system. The basic oxygen system is a much more  
advanced system of steel making than the open hearth system. The addition of a 
third vessel at the BOS will provide moren capacity than the  
No 2 Open Hearth shop, closures in which have been publicised by AIS as an 
indication of the grim state of the market. 
 
Similarly in ironmaking, AIS has steadily increased its capacity over the last few 
years, as is illustrated in the table below. Following a reline of No. 2 blast furnace, 
AIS has not brought it back online. The table below makes it quite clear, that even 
without No. 2, the capacities of the other three blast furnaces produce sufficient iron 
by themselves to meet the present steel making needs of the AIS complex. Thus 
without No. 2, the total ironmaking capacity stands at 12,900 tonnes, substantially 
more than the total capacity available in 1973 and 1975 with No. 2 included. 
Nonetheless, the fact that No. 2 blast furnace has not been brought back on line has 
been a central element in BHP's propaganda. 
 
Table 4: Blast Furnace Capacity, AIS, Port Kembla, 1973-1980. 
 
Blast Furnace  YEAR  
Capacity (tonnes) 1973 1975 1980 
No. 2 1,600 1,950 2,100 
No. 3 2,200 2,200 2,700 
No. 4 2,900 3,200 4,500 
No. 5 4,500 4,500 5,700 
Total Blast    
Furnace Capacity 11,200 11,850 15,000 
Source: "Hoskins Kembla Works", Public Relations Department, AIS, Port Kembla, 1973; 1975; 1980. 
[40] 
 
BHP spent $200m on new equipment for the steel industry in the 6 months to 
February 1982, and is now proposing to spend $300m a year for the next three 
years, partly to rectify technical errors, and to lift productivity by 30 percent. In the 
1981 financial year the company spent $307m on capital equipment in the steel 
division, more than twice what it spent the previous year. In the 1982 financial year, 
capital expenditure had increased still further to $350m. 
 
The rail mill at Port Kembla is being decommissioned as part of a rationalisation. The 
rails previously produced at Port Kembla will be produced at Whyalla and the plant at 
Port Kembla will specialise increasingly in flat products (slab, strip and tin). 
Newcastle will provide merchant (engineering) steel and at Whyalla a major facility 
equal to the best in the world has been introduced for the production of heavy rails. 
Another interesting aspect of the current production figures from the BHP is the ratio 
of raw steel produced to marketable steel. Peter Maher of the Financial Review 
(11.4.82) stated: 
But there is some evidence in an improved yield of marketable steel product 
on lower raw steel production so far this year, that some of BHP's 
modernisation schemes are already becoming effective. 
 
From 7 to 20 percent of the steel put through the primary slab and bloom mills is 
offcut and is recycled to the steelmaking furnaces, depending on the type of steel. In 
the secondary mills (as elsewhere) similar recycling occurs. In the plate mills, the 
amount of steel returned is measured in terms of a "divert rate". At Port Kembla, the 
lowest the divert rate has ever been is 5 percent, and in April 1982, the divert rate 
reached its second best ever; 5.15 percent. Any reduction in the amount of 
"wastage" (which is fed back into the process) will allow a reduction in the raw steel 
production without necessarily reducing the marketable steel tonnage. 
[41] 
 
 
In the first six months of the 1982 financial year the slab casting plant (continuous 
caster) at Port Kembla produced a record 505,090 tonnes. Continuous casting 
produces a more homogeneous steel with a better surface, and produces a greater 
yield of usable product by eliminating most of the offcutting losses sustained in the 
primary mills. The improvement in yields may be as great as 10-15 percent. Also at 
Port Kembla, feed is being rolled directly from the slabbing mill through the Hot Strip 
Mill, thus reducing the use of reheating furnaces, and is proceeding via an automatic 
scarfer eliminating hand scarfing at the slab yard. These processes reduce the 
amount of labour needed, and they produce more marketable steel from less raw 
steel. Presently, Port Kembla produces 3 tonnes of ingot steel for every tonne 
produced by continuous casting, but AIS is planning the introduction of an additional 
continuous caster once the third vessel on the Basic Oxygen System steel making 
plant comes on stream. This will reduce even further the raw to marketable steel 
ratio. 
 
Conclusion 
As this article goes to press (November 1982), the BHP has sacked 250 steel-
workers from its AIS Port Kembla plant. This is despite the fact that 3,000 jobs had 
already gone through 'natural' wastage and that in terms of the utilisation of crude 
steel capacity, Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) ranks among the highest in the 
world. 
 
Table 5: Crude Steel Capacity Utilisation Rates. 
 
Countries 1982 Utilisation rates in % 
U.S.A.   72.0 
 
Canada  75.0 
 
Oceania  85.0 
 
Japan   65.0  
 
EEC (10)  61.0  
 
Other Capitalist 
Countries  76.0 
 
Total OECD  67.0 
 
Rest of the 
Capitalist World 70.0 
 
Total Capitalist 
World   67.0 
Source: OECD Steel Committee. The Steel Market in 1981 and the Outlook for 1982, Paris, May 
1982. 
 
Since the publication of the OECD data in May 1982, the U.S. capacity utilization has 
dramatically fallen. On a slightly different basis to the OECD data, capacity utilization 
fell to 42.5Z in the week ending 5 June 1982, the lowest since 1938. The average for 
the 1982 year to June was 57%, down from 85.1% a year ago. In production terms 
this represents a fall of one third. 
[42] 
 
The view advanced here suggests that the significance of the labour shedding being 
undertaken by the management of AIS Port Kembla lies not so much in the extent of 
unemployment thus created in the Illawarra but in its duration. If the current labour 
force reductions are a product of increased imports and a shrinking market, then it 
could reasonably be expected that if imports were further restricted and the economy 
picked up jobs would once more be available to the workers of the Illawarra. If on the 
other hand, AIS Port Kembla is undertaking a substantial modernisation and 
rationalisation programme, then the jobs that are currently being lost will be lost at 
the region forever. The mining and steel unions in Port Kembla have taken the 
position that both processes are to work simultaneously, but that in the longer term 
modernisation and rationalisation are the major problems they confront. It is in this 
light that the unity and combativity of the steel and mining unions must be viewed. In 
their eyes, workers of the Illawarra are struggling not just to preserve their own jobs, 
but the jobs of their children as well; every job vacated, is a job destroyed. 
 
This view owes  much to the work of the Wollongong Workers' Research Centre 
(WRC), and has consistently been advanced in a number of studies it has 
undertaken of the steel industry in Port Kembla. Not only is it currently accepted by 
the Federal body of the Federated Ironworkers Association, but it is occasionally 
admitted by the BHP itself. In commenting upon the WRC's 14th report, "Job 
Destruction in the Port Kembla Steelworks", the BHP claimed, "urgent attention must 
be given to increasing labour productivity and decreasing costs per tonne of steel. 
This means that BHP, in order to be profitable, must employ less people per tonne of 
steel produced". 
 
In June 1982, in response to questioning from Temporary Assistance Authority 
(TAA) member Mr. Colin Conron, the BHP was forced to admit that up to May 1982, 
domestic and export sales had not significantly declined. In the same month, the 
BHP conceded to visiting ALP parliamentarians, that the closure of the rail mill and 
the No. 2 open hearth at Port Kembla were not caused by market decline, but were 
due to the introduction of new technology. 
 
Accordingly, the executive general manager of the steel division, Rice, told the TAA 
in July that there would be a "reduction in labour, irrespective of the outcome of the 
inquiry". These sentiments were echoed by the assist ant general manager at Port 
Kembla, who while discussing another issue, commented in passing to the Financial 
Review (29.10.82), that over the past two years, AIS had been planning to shut down 
outmoded operations, replacing them with more modern techniques, including the 
replacement of the No. 2 open hearth furnace with a BOS plant and the transfer of 
merchant mills and rails to Whyalla. He said that these decisions were accelerated 
by the downturn. 
 
Finally, according to the Business Review Weekly (20-26.11.82), "Senior BHP 
executives" have said that for every three workers losing their jobs, only one will be 
taken back when the recovery arrives. In our opinion,  the analysis of events made 
by the labour movement on the NSW South Coast is substantially correct. The 
economic base in the region, already so disastrously narrow, is being deliberately 
and permanently reduced by Australia's biggest corporation. Without decisive 
intervention by the state, the Wollongong sub-region faces a permanent, massive 
loss of jobs and deepening poverty. 
[43] 
